Storm King Mountain or South Canyon fire

[HorneTD]

The tenth anniversary of this fire is today. On July 6th,1994 fourteen
firefighters were killed when the fire on which blew up when a cold
front came through bringing erratic winds. They were constructing line
down hill which if I remember correctly is one of the watch out
situations. I have read that one of the after affects of the Storm King
Mountain or South Canyon fire was that crews were specifically empowered
to refuse assignments that they believed were too dangerous. There
were a number of incidents in the following year or two of crews
refusing to build hand line down hill. Fire managers became concerned
that they had lost control of what tactics they could apply. Without
trying to judge whether any of the refusals were warranted it seemed
that they were symptomatic of a major loss of confidence in wild fire
managers on the part of the ground troops. I do not know were the
situation now stands and would like to hear from anyone who does know.
With the deaths on the Thirtymile fire in Washington State have any
additional safety initiatives come out? Has crew confidence in
leadership recovered? Are crews still refusing some assignments. I
have not worked on a wildfire since 1976 so I am totally out of touch
with current practice.
--
Tom H

[Bob Lee]

HorneTD wrote:

you ask a lot of deep questions, and I'll try to answer some but it's a
lot.

Also, I'm gooing to x-post to alt.emergency-services.moderated to see if
it works out.

Post by HorneTD
The tenth anniversary of this fire is today. On July 6th,1994 fourteen
firefighters were killed when the fire on which blew up when a cold
front came through bringing erratic winds. They were constructing line
down hill which if I remember correctly is one of the watch out
situations.

Correct on the downhill line construction, but the Watch-out Situations
are just that - they are situations where mitigating measures are to be
taken, not "do not do" things. The "do not do" thngs would be the ten
standard firefighting orders:
http://www.nifc.gov/safety_study/10-18-lces.html

Post by HorneTD
I have read that one of the after affects of the Storm King
Mountain or South Canyon fire was that crews were specifically empowered
to refuse assignments that they believed were too dangerous.

Wildland fire crews have always had that "power," it just got emphasized
and encouraged after the South Canyon fire. There has been some
misconception about that.

Post by HorneTD
There were a number of incidents in the following year or two of crews
refusing to build hand line down hill. Fire managers became concerned
that they had lost control of what tactics they could apply.

Yeah, but it all worked out in the end. Downhill line is still built,
but people take mitigating measures. A Downhill Line Construction
Checklist exists, but I can't seem to find it on-line right now.

Post by HorneTD
Without trying to judge whether any of the refusals were warranted it
seemed that they were symptomatic of a major loss of confidence in
wild fire managers on the part of the ground troops. I do not know were
the situation now stands and would like to hear from anyone who does
know.

A number of measures sprang up from that exact concern. The foremost
was that federal agencies have worked to set minimum experience and
qualification standards for fire managers. The quals and experience
standards vary by position but the federal agencies are all working
towards adopting them. I could look for an on-line reference if you're
interested in viewing them.

Post by HorneTD
With the deaths on the Thirtymile fire in Washington State have any
additional safety initiatives come out?

Oh, hell yes. The major initiative to come out of the Thirtymile fire
would be the current work/rest guidelines that federal wildland
firefighters operate under. Also see:
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/safety/MTDC_Lessons/index.htm

Post by HorneTD
Has crew confidence in leadership recovered?

Was it ever complete? You can't speak for all crews all the time - no
one can - but I think there is a currently certain healthy questioning
going on. There are always peaks and valleys - at least in the thirty
years I've been involved.

Post by HorneTD
Are crews still refusing some assignments.

Yes, but sometimse not when they should be:
http://www.myfirecommunity.net/documents/1999_sadler_report.pdf

Tom, check out this link - I think you'll find it interesting:
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/

Bob

[Bob Lee]

... A Downhill Line Construction
Checklist exists, but I can't seem to find it on-line right now.

Found it! THe downhill fireline construction checklist can be found in
the Fireline Handbook:
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/large.html#FirelineHandbook
Specifica,,y, in Chapter 1 Firefighting Safety
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/410-1/chapter01.pdf

And also in the Incident Response Pocket Guide (which is a much bigger
download):
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/IRPG_Jan2004.pdf

They read as follows:

Downhill Checklist:
Downhill fireline construction is hazardous in steep terrain,
fast-burning fuels, or rapidly changing weather. Downhill fireline
construction should not be attempted unless there is no tactical
alternative. When building downhill fireline, the following is required:

1. Crew supervisor(s) and fireline overhead will discuss assignments
prior to committing crew(s). Responsible overhead individual will stay
with job until completed (TFLD or ICT4 qualified or better).
2. Decision will be made after proposed fireline has been scouted by
supervisor(s) of involved crew(s).
3. L.C.E.S. will be coordinated for all personnel involved.
- Crew supervisor(s) is in direct contact with lookout who can see the
fire.
- Communication is established between all crews.
- Rapid access to safety zone(s) in case fire crosses below crew(s).
4. Direct attack will be used whenever possible; if not possible, the
fireline should be completed between anchor points before being fired
out.
5. Fireline will not lie in or adjacent to a chute or chimney.
6. Starting point will be anchored for crew(s) building fireline down
from the top.
7. Bottom of the fire will be monitored; if the potential exists for the
fire to spread, action will be taken to secure the fire edge.

And in case you're curious about the LCES - Lookouts, Communication,
Escape routes, Safety areas - reference:

LCES Checklist:
LCES must be established and known to ALL firefighters BEFORE needed.

Lookout(s)
- Experienced / Competent / Trusted
- Enough lookouts at good vantage points
- Knowledge of crew locations
- Knowledge of escape and safety locations
- Knowledge of trigger points
- Map / Weather Kit / Watch / IAP (Incident Action Plan)
Communication(s)
- Radio frequencies confirmed
- Backup procedures and check-in times established
- Provide updates on any situation change
- Sound alarm early, not late
Escape Route(s)
- More than one escape route
- Avoid steep uphill escape routes
- Scouted: Loose soils / Rocks / Vegetation
- Timed: Slowest person / Fatigue & Temperature factors
- Marked: Flagged for day or night
- Evaluate: Escape time vs. Rate of spread
- Vehicles parked for escape
Safety Zone(s)
- Survivable without a fire shelter
- Back into clean burn
- Natural Features: Rock Areas / Water / Meadows
- Constructed Sites: Clearcuts / Roads / Helispots
- Scouted for size and hazards
- Upslope? *
- Downwind? *
- Heavy Fuels? *
* More heat impact -> Larger safety zone

Escape time and safety zone size requirements will change as fire
behavior changes.

hth,
Bob

[Bob Lee]

HorneTD wrote:

you ask a lot of deep questions, and I'll try to answer some but it's a
lot.

Also, I'm going to x-post to alt.emergency-services.moderated to see if
it works out.

Post by HorneTD
The tenth anniversary of this fire is today. On July 6th,1994 fourteen
firefighters were killed when the fire on which blew up when a cold
front came through bringing erratic winds. They were constructing line
down hill which if I remember correctly is one of the watch out
situations.

Correct on the downhill line construction, but the Watch-out Situations
are just that - they are situations where mitigating measures are to be
taken, not "do not do" things. The "do not do" thngs would be the ten
standard firefighting orders:
http://www.nifc.gov/safety_study/10-18-lces.html

Post by HorneTD
I have read that one of the after affects of the Storm King
Mountain or South Canyon fire was that crews were specifically empowered
to refuse assignments that they believed were too dangerous.

Wildland fire crews have always had that "power," it just got emphasized
and encouraged after the South Canyon fire. There has been some
misconception about that.

Post by HorneTD
There were a number of incidents in the following year or two of crews
refusing to build hand line down hill. Fire managers became concerned
that they had lost control of what tactics they could apply.

Yeah, but it all worked out in the end. Downhill line is still built,
but people take mitigating measures. A Downhill Line Construction
Checklist exists, but I can't seem to find it on-line right now.

Post by HorneTD
Without trying to judge whether any of the refusals were warranted it
seemed that they were symptomatic of a major loss of confidence in
wild fire managers on the part of the ground troops. I do not know were
the situation now stands and would like to hear from anyone who does
know.

A number of measures sprang up from that exact concern. The foremost
was that federal agencies have worked to set minimum experience and
qualification standards for fire managers. The quals and experience
standards vary by position but the federal agencies are all working
towards adopting them. I could look for an on-line reference if you're
interested in viewing them.

Post by HorneTD
With the deaths on the Thirtymile fire in Washington State have any
additional safety initiatives come out?

Oh, hell yes. The major initiative to come out of the Thirtymile fire
would be the current work/rest guidelines that federal wildland
firefighters operate under. Also see:
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/safety/MTDC_Lessons/index.htm

Post by HorneTD
Has crew confidence in leadership recovered?

Was it ever complete? You can't speak for all crews all the time - no
one can - but I think there is a currently certain healthy questioning
going on. There are always peaks and valleys - at least in the thirty
years I've been involved.

Post by HorneTD
Are crews still refusing some assignments.

Yes, but sometimse not when they should be:
http://www.myfirecommunity.net/documents/1999_sadler_report.pdf

Tom, check out this link - I think you'll find it interesting:
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/

Bob

[t]

snip< They were constructing line down hill which if I remember correctly
is one of the watch out situations.

As I recall even more relevant was the fact that the safety zone the
black wasn't. Gambrel oak had been burned over but not consumed
when the winds pushed the brush burned again hot. Another finding
was the lack of clear authority. Who was running the show: the
jumpers, the locals, the regular 20-man crew ?

I have read that one of the after affects of the Storm King
Mountain or South Canyon fire was that crews were specifically empowered
to refuse assignments that they believed were too dangerous.

No this isn't correct. Individual firefighters had had this specific
right of refusal as part of the mandatory refresher training at least
since the late 80's. Crews have always refused assignments if they
were well-lead and thought their safety was being compromised. On
the 1985 Savage Creek Fire we were chased off the line two days in a
row by a fire boss who lit backfires underneath us without warning.
At the end of shift our crew boss had us pack up and head home and
was more than eager to tell anyone who cared to listen why we left.
There was no recrimination whatsoever. Crews or individuals refusing
assignments was/is not uncommon and not much was said about it.

There were a number of incidents in the following year or two of crews
refusing to build hand line down hill. Fire managers became concerned
that they had lost control of what tactics they could apply. Without
trying to judge whether any of the refusals were warranted it seemed
that they were symptomatic of a major loss of confidence in wild fire
managers on the part of the ground troops.
I do not know were the situation now stands and would like to hear
from anyone who does know.
With the deaths on the Thirtymile fire in Washington State have any
additional safety initiatives come out? Has crew confidence in
leadership recovered? Are crews still refusing some assignments.

I don't believe potential mutiny was/is the problem. Two yrs ago I
know of a situation where the div sup directed two hotshot crews to
direct attack along a jeep road. One crew boss thought it too hairy
and declined the assignment, the other headed out. The line held but
the deployed crew got a little singed and filed a report. The div
sup's tactics were found to be unsound and he was removed from the
team, He retained his quals but the dispatch call never comes.

After South Canyon the FS added emphasis to the IC position, but
Thirtymile resulted in the loss of confidence in the troops, rather
than by the troops. "Regulars", miltia firefighters who have other
day to day jobs in the Forest Service, are only reluctantly used now
and then usually for mop-up. The hiring and personnel policies of the
last decade may have contributed a lot to the folks "collaborating"
on the rocks (the ones who died) versus the "diverse" folks out
in the river ( who didn't die).

So the firefighters are now full-time, better trained,and urged to
question authority in matters of safety. Good thing because confidence
in the leadership is no longer a factor. Aside from attempts at social
engineering, nothing has decimated fire leadership more greatly than
the flood of retirements that continue to this day. Fire management
jobs go begging, a dozen new outreach positions are advertised every
day, week after week. This results in everybody working one position
higher than their quals. Long on training / short on experience.
The dying continues: The Cramer fire victims,and the spotter who let
them out the door, were TRAINED to say no but were too damned young
to know WHEN to say no. The fire boss was brain-dead from lack of
sleep and I still wonder - where the hell was air attack?

While the better managed fire programs have made the adjustments to
current realities it remains to be seen if fatal blunders can be
reduced, if not avoided altogether.